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Recent Developments

Carpenter Realty v. Imbesi:
Judgment Creditor is Not Entitled to Post-Judgment Interest from Date of
an Original Judgment that Was Reversed on Appeal
By: Brenda N. Taylor
he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held
a
judgment creditor is not entitled to
post-judgment interest from the date
of an original judgment that was
reversed on appeal. Carpenter
Realty Corp. v. Imbesi, 369 Md.
549, 801 A.2d 1018 (2002). The
court further held that unless the
court includes a specific instruction
to a trial court that post-judgment
interest must be awarded dating
back to the entry of the original
judgment, such award "should rest
with the sound discretion of the trial
court." Id. at 561, 801 A.2d at
1025.
Thomas Imbesi ("Imbesi")
entered into a Stock Redemption
Agreement ("SRA") with Carpenter
Realty ("Carpenter"), 7Up/
Baltimore ("7Up") and several
additional 7Up entities. Imbesi later
redeemed his corporate stock for
$500,000 plus 5Y4% interest and
forgiveness ofa $137,158.00 debt
he owed to the corporations. The
corporations defaulted on the loan
in July 1991. Imbesi died on March
10, 1992.
Imbesi's
personal
representative filed a lawsuit in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
against Carpenter and 7Up for
payment. Carpenter and 7Up filed
a counterclaim against the Estate
asserting that Imbesi had an
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outstanding note in the amount of
$80,000.00 plus 6% interest due
and payable to them.
A bench trial ended in a
$57,447.67 judgment for the Estate,
which did not include pre-judgment
interest. A setoff of the $80,000
note was not allowed because the
corporations had not filed a timely
claim for payment against the Estate
pursuant to Maryland Code (1974,
1991 Repl. Vol.) Section 8-103 of
the Estates and Trusts Article.
Carpenter and 7Up appealed. The
court of special appeals reversed
and remanded for a hearing on
whether the note could be used as
a setoff.
The circuit court held, in a
case of first impression, that the
$80,000.00 note could be used as
a defensive setoffdespite the running
ofthe statute oflimitations under
Maryland's Non-claim Statute, Md.
Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 8-103.
The court ordered entry ofjudgment
in favor of Carpenter and 7Up. The
Estate appealed and the court of
special appeals affirmed. The court
of appeals reversed and remanded.
The Estate petitioned the circuit
court for entry of judgment for
$57,447.67, prejudgment interest of
$3,588.51 and postjudgment
interest of$30,518.09. Carpenter
and 7Up filed a cross-petition
conceding $57,971.27 but

contesting the pre- and postjudgment interest. The Estate was
awarded costs, damages, and
accrued prejudgment interest. The
Estate appealed.
The court of special appeals
held the Estate was entitled to receive 10% postjudgment interest
commencing on April 4, 1995, the
date when judgment was entered in
favor of the Estate after the first
trial. Carpenter filed a petition for
writ of certiorari, which the court
of appeals granted.
In its analysis, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland first
considered Maryland's statutes
governing postjudgment interest.
Carpenter, 369 Md. at 558, 801
A.2d at 1023. Maryland Rule 2604(b) provides that "a money
judgment shall bear interest at the
rate prescribed by law from the
date of entry." Id. at 558, 801
A.2d at 1024. Maryland Rule 2601 (b) provides that "the effective
date of entry of a judgment is the
date on which the clerk of the court
prepares a written record of the
judgment." Id. at 559, 801 A.2d
at 1024.
The court next determined
what constituted the date of entry
of a judgment when the initial
judgment was reversed and
remanded and subsequent
judgments were entered on the
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record. Id. at 559, 801 A.2d at
1024. Maryland Rule 8-604( e)
provides "[i]n reversing or
modifying a judgment in whole or in
part, the court may enter an
appropriate judgment directly or
may order the lower court to do so."
Id. at 560,801 A.2d at 1025. The
court stated that "where our
mandate specifically directs the
entry of a judgment after remand,
postjudgment interest on the award
runs from the date of issuance ofthe
mandate." Id. at 560-61; 801 A.2d
at 1025. When the appellate court
fails to give the trial court specific
instructions mandating an award of
postjudgment interest dating back to
the entry of the original judgment,
the trial court may use its sound
discretion to determine whether to
make such an award. Carpenter,
369 Md. at 561,801 A.2d at 1025.
The court next reviewed the
history of the case from the entry of
the original judgment through the
subsequent mandates issued on
appeal. Id. The April 10, 1995
circuit court order entering judgment
in favor of the Estate was a final
judgment for purposes of appellate
review. Id. On August 6, 1996 the
court of special appeals issued a
mandate that reversed the original
judgment and remanded the case;
the mandate did not specifically
leave the original judgment in place.
Id. at 562,801 A.2d at 1026. Either
party could have filed a motion to
alter, amend, or revise the judgment,
requesting the court to leave the
original judgment in place. Id. at
563,801 A.2d at 1026.
Motions to alter, amend or
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revise judgments are governed by
Maryland Rule 2-534. Id. This rule
provides that on motion of any party
filed within ten days after entry of
judgment, the court may amend the
judgment, or may enter a new
judgment. Carpenter, 369 Md. at
563,801 A.2d at 1026. Maryland
Rule 2-535 provides that on motion
of any party filed within 30 days
after entry of judgment, the court
may exercise revisory power and
control over the judgment and, if the
action was tried before the court,
may take any action that it could
have taken under Rule 2-534. Id.
Maryland Rule 8-431 governs
general motions to the court of
appeals or court of special appeals.
Id. Because neither Imbesi nor
Carpenter filed such a motion, the
court stated that the court of special
appeals' reversal eliminated the
April 10, 1995 judgment. Id. at
567,801 A.2d at 1029.
The court concluded that for
purposes of calculating postjudgment interest, Carpenter and
7Up were not required to pay the
Estate until the circuit court entered
its judgment on October 19,2000.
Id. at 567,801 A.2d at 1029. Postjudgment interest was not awarded
because the judgment in favor ofthe
Estate was immediately paid from
the escrow account upon entry of
the judgment. Id. at 568,801 A.2d
at 1029.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland sent a clear message that
a judgment creditor is not entitled
to postjudgment interest from the
date of an original judgment that was
reversed on appeal unless the

court's mandate specifically dictates
such an award. To preserve postjudgment interest, attorneys must file
a motion requesting the court to
include specific instructions for the
calculation of such interest from the
date of the original judgment in its
mandate. Where monetary awards
are delayed by appeals, attorneys
who make this extra effort protect
their clients' right to interest
compensation when the judgment
becomes final.

